It may take weeks or months before a stealthy attack is detected. As networks scale up in size and speed, monitoring for such attempts is increasingly a challenge; collection and inspection of individual packets is difficult as the volume and the rate of traffic rise. This paper presents an efficient method to overcome such a challenge. Data reduction has become an integral part of passive network monitoring, which could be motivated as long as it preserves the required level of precision. This paper examines the feasibility of employing traffic sampling together with a simple, but a systematic, data fusion technique for monitoring; and whether the design of the network affects on non-sampling error. Proposed approach is capable of monitoring for stealthy suspicious activities using 10%-20% size sampling rates without degrading the quality of detections.
devices for packet processing and more bandwidth for transmissions them to 10 collection points [3] . Sophisticated computing systems may be required for 11 analysis and storage such a huge volume of data. The performance of network 12 can be affected by such overheads and hence to quality of the service. All 13 these facts motivate for a data reduction which could be motivated as long as 14 it preserves the required level of precision for the monitoring objectives which 15 can be either traffic engineering, accounting or security specific.
16
This paper presents a study for an efficient monitoring scheme for stealthy 17 attacks on computer networks which can consider as an early warning system.
18
Traffic sampling is employed together with a simple data fusion technique to 19 propose the algorithm which applies over the sampled traffic. The study has two 
Security Monitoring

34
Computer systems are dynamic systems having many components such as 35 clients, servers, switches, firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs). At 36 each time interval these components produce large amounts of event based data 37 which, in principal, can be collected and used for security analysis. The sig-38 nature elements of an attack is scattered spatially and temporally, and often 39 embedded within the totality of events of the distributed systems, and motiva- 
The Bayesian paradigm
114
The posterior probability of the hypothesis H k given that E is given by the well-known Bayes formula:
The hypothesis for the monitoring algorithm is built as follows. Let H 1 and H 2 be two possible states of a node in a network and define H 1 -the node acts as an attacker and H 2 -the node does not act as an attacker. Then H 1 and H 2 are mutually exclusive and exhaustive states. P(H 1 ) is an expression of belief, in terms of probability, that the node is in state H 1 in the absence of any other knowledge. Once obtained more knowledge on the proposition H 1 through multiple information sources (m indicators), in the form of evidence E={e 1 ,e 2 ,e 3 ,...,e m } on attack surface including the human element, the belief can be expressed in terms of conditional probabilities as p(H 1 /E). Using the Bayes' theorem in Equation 1 and assuming statistical independence between information sources:
When likelihoods p(e j /H i ) and prior p(H i ) are known, the posterior p(H 1 /E) can be calculated for a given w. These posterior terms p(H 1 /E) can be accumu- 
Peer analysis
Aggregating posterior probability terms in Equation 2 over the time helps to accumulate relatively weak evidence for long periods. These accumulated probability terms t p(H 1 /E) (t is time), known as node scores, can be used as a measurement of the level of suspicion of a given node at any given time with respect to her peers as follows. A given set of node profiles, e.g. profiles corresponding to a similar peer group, is a uni-variate data set. Hence it is possible to use the uni-variate version of Grubb's test [18] (maximum normed residual test) to detect anomalous points in the set, subject to the assumption that normal node profiles in a given set follow an unknown Gaussian distribution [19] . The set-up where it has the distribution is very well a mixture of Gaussian. Because testing of the hypothesis for any given time is a Bernoulli trial in this work. Accumulated Bernoulli trials makes a Binomial distribution which can be approximated by a Normal distribution. For each profile score ω, its z score is computed as:
Whereω and s are mean and standard deviation of the data set. A test instance 156 is declared to be anomalous at significance level α if:
where N is the number of profile points in the set, and t α/N,N −2 is the lous [6] . n h for stratum h during a w is given by:
[
where n h -sample size for stratum h, n-total sample size, N i -population size 
249
International unit (IU) in pharmacology is a well-known example for a similar 250 approach for a common unit of measurement for the amount of a substance [24] .
251
The main advantage of above sampling technique is producing the most repre-252 sentative sample of a population to the least cost. Hence it is the ideal sampling 253 technique to employ with the problem as "cost" parameter can be minimised, 254 subject to the required precision, to obtain a light-weighted monitoring scheme.
255
The rule of thumb in stratification sampling that a population should not consist 
Tracing the Source
278
A common problem with many analysis tools and techniques today is that 
286
The localization process becomes evermore difficult when the attacker em- input : Topological information together with victim's location output: Tree structure for the given attack scenario Initialize the tree ϑ to have the root as the gateway of the victim; List all nodes into the list τ ; /* attached each node to the tree*/; tree-construction(ϑ,τ ); /*ϑ -Tree; , ω -A node*/; foreach node ω in τ do if num-of-hops-between(ϑ,ω)==1 then insert ω into ϑ; end end foreach ϑ.child do tree-construction(ϑ.child,τ ) end Algorithm 1: Tree formation for a given attack scenario. 
where n k is the number of nodes behind k th channel. Then
is the Z-score of channel k at time t.
, and
To traverse a non-empty tree, perform the following operations recursively 319 at each node, starting from the root of the tree, until suspected node is found. 
Experiments
334
A series of experiments were conducted simulating stealthy suspicious ac-335 tivities in simulated networks to evaluate the proposed approach in this paper.
336
Simulating such activities on a real network certainly gives more realistic condi- cious events generated by healthy nodes, but at different rates λ n , n = 1, 2, 3, 4.
352
It was ensured to maintain λ a ∈ λ n ±3 √ λ n and λ n (≤ 0.1) sufficiently smaller for all experiments to characterise stealthy suspicious activities which aim at stay-
354
ing beneath the threshold of detection and hiding behind the background noise.
355
The idea to use the above relationship for generating attacker activities was to 2 A Denial of Service (DoS) attack which sets the source and destination information of a TCP segment to be the same. A vulnerable machine will crash or freeze due to the packet being repeatedly processed by the TCP stack. analyse day-to-day traffic and build statistical models of normal behaviour. 
Results
409
In this section, experimental results are presented. Graphical forms (e.g.
410
Z-Score graphs) are using to present information. Visualisation helps to quickly 411 recognise patterns in data. and A3 in Figure 2 ) responses to that behaviour by changing its direction. There are three fundamental interpretations of probability: Frequentest, Propensity and Subjectivist. In Subjectivist, probability of an event is subjective to personal measure of the belief in that event is occurring. 
on the basis of the higher the detection potential the better for the detection.
479
An attacker was located in a 51 size subnet and generated suspicious events.
480
The same experiment was repeated six times by keeping all parameters un- and going beyond 100 size subnet would not make any real sense in terms of 497 detection (see Figure 13) . The smaller the subnet size is the better for detection. 
Number of attackers
499
The same experiment was repeated many times by keeping all conditions A sampling process has two types of errors: sampling and non-sampling.
522
Sampling error occurs because of the chance, and it is impossible to avoid but proportion of illegitimate to legitimate traffic, i.e. a : (n − a), is a dominating 
whereπ is the observed proportion from samples. This can be used to draw 542 inference about the unknown population proportion φ.
543
Sampling rate (r) Traffic samples at 5%, 10%, 20%, 40%, and 80% rates of 544 the whole trace were drawn andπ was calculated. The null hypothesis H 0 is the 545 assertion that the sample proportion π conforms to the whole traffic proportion 546 φ. The alternative hypothesis H 1 is the opposite of H 0 .
547
H 0 : ∀r π r = φ (11)
πs and p-values of testing H 0 vs H 1 are given in Table 3 
πs and p-values of testing H 0 vs H 1 are given in 
πs and p-values of testing H 0 vs H 1 are given in Table 5 . Since p-values are and proportion π, where n is increasingπ is decreasing in overall (deviates from 579 the actual value), regardless of sampling. at node g 13 , and so on. Finally search is narrowing down to the subnet S6.
597
Step 4 graph is created at S6 's gateway node g 34 , where A denotes the Z-598 scores corresponded to the true attacker located in that subnet. M in and M ax 599 represent the minimum and maximum Z-scores of all other nodes in subnet S6.
600
T denotes the threshold which is not defined when number of data points in a 601 set is less than three. In that case the highest scored path is chosen to move 602 towards (see Step 2) in finding attacker or directions to her location.
603
A similar manner should be followed in interpreting graphs in Figure 24 604 obtained for multiple attackers. In that case, once an attacker is found tracing 605 algorithm should be back tracked to its immediate parent node and should 606 proceed with next highest Z-scored sub tree to find other suspicious nodes. After
607
Steps 3 and 6, algorithm back tracks to the root node. Table 6 summarises travel 608 sequences for tracing single and multiple attackers. justify that suitability of a sampling frame depends on the detection algorithm.
764
Former investigates how packet sampling impacts on three specific port scan 
